Dispatch 4 - Arrogance and Aggravation Across the Iranian Archipelago
Now that a new regional detente may be on the table, what can one expect of the Iranian sphere of influence?
Hello again dear readers,
I hope you are all doing well and staying in good spirits.
I recently went on what was supposed to be a “holiday,” and I really tried not to “work.” However, given my natural tendencies, I couldn’t help but make some observations during my little adventure.
I traveled to Iraq over the weekend, staying in Baghdad from this past Thursday to Sunday.
During those four days, I visited a number of neighborhoods in Iraq’s capital, as well as the holy city of Karbala and the old city of Babylon.
And, as always, I would like to present you with the good stuff first.
Contrary to the prejudices of many, both in the West and the Arab world, Iraqis are a kind and warm people who have great food, great culture, and great hospitality.
On multiple occasions, people stopped us on the street to say hello and welcome us to their country.
If we even glanced at some food being sold on the street, it was offered to us free of charge.
Iraq’s natural beauty is undeniable, and it truly is an amazing country.
Regardless of pleasant experiences, however, the Iraqi people, who have suffered under dictatorship, occupation, and social chaos, still have many challenges they will have to overcome moving forward.
So, I thought I would write a post (I would love to tell you that it will be brief, but you and I both know that is never the case) delving into Iraq, Syria, and, of course, Lebanon, in the context of Iranian influence and the recent “detente” between Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic.
Out of general cleanliness, I will divide this post into three sections, one for each country mentioned above, and what Iranian influence truly means in those respective contexts.
Regarding the title of this post, well, I’ll get to that in my conclusion.
Otherwise, let us begin!
Iraq
I had two major observations regarding my trip to Iraq.
The first is that Iran is somehow even more arrogant in Baghdad than it is in Beirut.
And the second is that, regardless of the political context, the aesthetic of Shiite unity in Iraq, at least contrary to my assumptions before visiting, is just as jarring as it is in Lebanon.
Regarding my first observation, every step of our journey through the land of the two rivers was plastered with, let’s say, Iranian-inspired imagery.
From the second we left the airport, the first thing I saw was the twisted remains of the car in which Qasem Soleimani took his last joyride before he got turned into mincemeat by the orange man.
The now-shrine is on the airport road that every visitor to Iraq must take to enter Baghdad.
From there, almost every street (excluding the green zone and some other areas) was plastered with the usual martyrs and what have you.
Now, I do not mean to disrespect the young, largely Shiite, men who answered the call to fight the Islamic State (IS), as that truly was a noble cause.
But let’s not act as if Iran mobilized against IS out of charity, when, in reality, its only goal was to defend its geopolitical interests.
Though there are not really too many checkpoints in the city, at least in the areas that we visited, the military (and militia) presence is highly visible.
Indeed, just down the street from the hotel in which we stayed, there was an HQ or outpost for Saraya al-Jihad, an Iranian-backed militia part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which were formed in response to IS’s conquest of northern and central Iraq in 2014.
Anyway, during our first night, we decided to go to Karbala, as I believed that it would be a deeply meaningful experience to see the shrines of Abbas and Hussein, even as a non-Muslim and non-Shiite.
The battle of Karbala, which occurred over 1300 years ago, is still mourned by Shiites every year during Ashura.
For a short history lesson, Hussein, the son of Ali, who Shiites consider to be the first rightful Caliph after the prophet Muhammad, was brutally killed in Karbala alongside his companions and family, making the city, functionally speaking, one of, if not the most, holiest sites in Shi’a Islam.
And let me tell you, visiting the shrines of Abbas and Hussein was probably the most mesmerizing experience I have ever had in my life.
Men and women, praying, crying, and hitting themselves, chanting as they approached the shrines, was, frankly, a hypnotic experience that I am still processing almost a week later.
Indeed, I found it to be a beautiful and awe-inspiring pronouncement of faith.
However, regardless of my appreciation of piety, the presence of Iran, everyone’s favorite player in the Middle East, save for Saudi Arabia, was extremely felt.
For our entire trip, it felt as if the constant posters and billboards were saying: “we, the Iranians, own this country and its people.”
If one visits predominantly Shiite regions of Lebanon, such as the south or Beirut’s southern suburbs (I have not yet been to the Bekaa Valley so I will not comment on that region), it is not even close to the level of Iranian bravado I saw in Baghdad.
At least in Lebanon, Hezbollah, Iran’s primary conduit of hard power in the country, has its own flair to it. In Iraq, the Iranians really want you to know it is only them who get to decide how things go.
Indeed, it really takes a certain level of arrogance and chauvinism for a non-Arab country to project its power in such a visible way in Arab lands, but I will expand on this in the conclusion.
The second major thing I noticed, next to Iranian arrogance, was the fabricated veneer of Shiite unity one is faced with when traveling through Shiite regions of the country.
Before my visit, I had assumed that there would be Sadrist regions and, for lack of a better term, non-Sadrist regions when it came to the Iraq of the Shiites, who now dominate the country’s political institutions.
For a bit of context, Muqtada Sadr, to whom I am referring when I say Sadrist, is a firebrand Shiite cleric of the prominent Sadr family, who has been a major player in Iraqi politics since he inherited his father’s legacy following his assassination in 1999. Anyone with a bit of historical knowledge regarding Lebanon or the Middle East will recognize this family name as the same as Musa Sadr, who established the Amal Movement in Lebanon in the 1970s.
After the Americans toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, religious Shiite political activity, which had been strictly repressed by Saddam’s nominally secular Baathist party, was allowed to flourish.
Muqtada Sadr, still quite young, rapidly grew in popularity among Iraqi Shiites, forming his own militia, known at the time as the Mahdi Army, which fought both the American occupation and the government that it established.
However, following the drawdown of American forces, the rise of IS, and then Iraq’s explosive revolution in October 2019, Sadr moved against Iran, drawing upon his populist inclinations.
However, regardless of his religious clout, Sadr is not particularly skilled in politics. He knows how to draw supporters and run a militia, but he does not know how to play the parliamentary game, something the Iranians have become particularly good at over the years.
Anyway, to spare both you and I the details, over this past summer, Sadr’s supporters first occupied Iraq’s parliament, which is dominated by Iranian-backed parties, and then his militia, now known as Saraya al-Salam, attacked Baghdad’s green zone, resulting in some of the worst fighting Baghdad has seen in years.
Sadr’s forces were, frankly, humiliated, and he swiftly called for his men to withdraw from the city.
Skirmishes subsequently broke out in some other southern cities, but nothing like what happened in August.
Regardless of this Shiite infighting, every poster and billboard generally had three common faces on them: Muqtada Sadr, Qasem Soleimani, and Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s current supreme leader.
Obviously, there was some variation, such as depictions of Sadr’s father or Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, but the vibe was always the same: the Shiites are united against the imperialists or colonialists, yada yada.
I could not help but be reminded of some of the posters (though a bit more rare) depicting Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah alongside the Amal Movement’s Nabih Berri.
For those who are not aware, Hezbollah and Amal actually fought each other during the Lebanese civil war in a sub-conflict known as the War of Brothers, and, if one has made an effort to interact with Lebanese Shiites, it will become apparent that Hezbollah supporters and Amal supporters are not biggest fans of each other, to say the least.
Said sub-conflict was, in many ways, a proxy war between Iran, which supported Hezbollah, and Syria, which supported Amal, even though Iran’s presence in Lebanon had ultimately gotten the seal of approval from Syria’s then-ruler Hafez al-Assad.
Indeed, in Lebanon, the divisions between Hezbollah areas and Amal areas are far more visible than in Iraq.
Either way, from the perspective of Iran’s leadership, it seems quite apparent that Iraq is an Iranian possession, regardless of the fact that US forces are still very much present in the country.
Syria
For Syria, I do not have too much to say, as I have not been to Syria, nor do I have any serious plans to visit the country anytime soon.
Don’t get me wrong, there is nothing I desire more than to see Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Palmyra, and many other regions of Syria that a traveler like myself would be interested in.
However, as a very small fish journalist, I really would not feel super comfortable faffing around Syria like I do Lebanon, or, to a lesser degree, Iraq.
That mainly has to do with the primary political reason that makes Syria different from Iraq and Lebanon, that being the fact that Syria is a relatively centralized dictatorship, unlike the corrupt and authoritarian “democracies” of Iraq and Lebanon.
In Syria, Iran’s strategy is ultimately the same, just in a somewhat different context.
Iran has its proxy forces and elements of the Syrian state it can depend on, such as Fatemiyoun brigades, an Iranian-backed Afghan Shiite militia, and the 4th Armored Division of the Syrian army which is led by Maher al-Assad, the brother of Syria’s current ruler, Bashar al-Assad.
However, unlike Iraq and Lebanon, these units are not participating in a “democracy” (neither Iraq nor Lebanon are democracies by the way) and are still relatively separate from the Syrian state itself, at least for the most part.
Of course, Maher’s 4th Division is a part of the Syrian state in a way that foreign Shiite militias aren’t, but Maher does not have a political face in the same way that Hezbollah or the PMF does.
Indeed, Bashar, by way of being a dictator, has done a better job of insulating himself from Iranian machinations than the Iraqi or Lebanese governments, which are fully dominated by Iranian-backed political parties.
Bashar’s power comes from Syria’s security apparatus, which is dominated by Alawites, the religion to which his family adheres, and he constantly is shuffling said apparatus to prevent coups and plots against his rule.
Considering that it seems that Bashar’s father taught him well, Syria’s dictator is well aware that the Russians and the Iranians, the foreign governments that directly assist him in maintaining his rule over Syria, might not actually like him that much and may even prefer someone they can manipulate with greater ease.
So, he makes sure that Syria’s security apparatus, as well as other less important branches of the state, are in constant flux, preventing anyone from getting any ideas that they could move against him.
Of course, Bashar has had to make certain concessions to Iran so that he can continue to rely on the much-needed manpower that the Islamic Republic is able to provide, such as allowing Iranian-backed militias to entrench themselves in critical regions of the country, like the Golan Heights, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zor, which borders Iraq.
Ultimately, however, the big man still rules Syria, not Iran.
Lebanon
I have lived in Lebanon for almost a year and a half now and have grown accustomed to its general political dynamics.
Lebanon is a country of many dichotomies, most of which either exist in parallel to each other or simply overlap.
Some observers, mainly idiots, see the country as being divided between Muslims and Christians.
Other observers, who are not as stupid but may need to re-evaluate their biases, see Lebanon as divided between the Sunnis and the Shiites.
Historians may see it as divided between the Maronites and the Druze, with the Shiites and Sunnis coming into play as distinct political entities a little bit more recently.
Good Marxists, like myself, may see Lebanon as a country divided between the Haves (those who make or have access to dollars) and the Have-Nots (those who do not make or have access to dollars).
And, as my friend Adnan Nasser recently wrote, some may understand the country as divided between the Lebanon of Hezbollah and the Lebanon of, well, not Hezbollah.
Though I may personally put more emphasis on the second-to-last dichotomy that I listed, it is worth thinking about Hezbollah’s vision for Lebanon in contrast to the “other” Lebanon, though even that is deeply divided along sectarian and ideological lines.
Before I get into the meat of this section, it is important to be clear that there are varying degrees of Iranian influence across its archipelago, varying to the extent that I do not consider Palestine or Yemen to be in said archipelago, at least in the context of my understanding of Iran’s ambitions for the region.
In Palestine and Yemen, groups backed by Iran, namely Hamas and the Houthis respectively, formed independently of Iran and have relatively different religious and ideological backgrounds that diverge from the Islamic Republic’s vision for the region.
Hamas is a Sunni Islamist group and the Houthis, though not entirely, are a Zaydi revivalist movement, which, just in terms of religion, are very much in conflict with Iran’s ideological impulses.
As I said earlier regarding Lebanon, viewing the current Middle Eastern conflict as one between Sunni and Shi’a is simplistic and not helpful. Even Alawites, the religious group that dominates the Syrian government, would generally be considered heretics in Twelver Shi’a Islam, the sect of Islam to which Iran’s government prescribes.
Then you have Hezbollah, which could not have formed in the way that we know it without Iran’s backing but still enjoys a certain level of independence in comparison to other groups.
Indeed, it seems quite obvious at this point that some sort of armed Shiite resistance would have formed in opposition to Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon following its 1982 invasion of the country to expel Palestinian armed groups. However, said opposition would almost certainly not have been as well armed or organized had Iran not assisted in its formation.
Then you have the Afghan, Pakistani, and Iraqi Shiite militias that are essentially just extensions of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) and have very little to no autonomy.
But anyways, Lebanon truly was Iran’s testing ground in terms of building its regional strategy.
In the context of Lebanon’s weak and sectarian state, Hezbollah is a symptom that eventually became the disease.
What I mean here is that, much like the Palestinian armed groups that built institutions separate from the Lebanese state throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, Iran capitalized on Lebanon’s inability to maintain a monopoly on violence, a concept political scientists often use when analyzing state capacity.
However, unlike the Palestinians, which, granted had allies within the Lebanese state, never truly became part of it, Hezbollah eventually managed to consume the Lebanese state without ever having to take on the responsibilities that that entails.
Many in Lebanon will rightfully tell you that Hezbollah is the ruler of Lebanon, but this is not exactly true.
In recent years, Hezbollah has managed to sideline its foes, either through political coercion or outright violence, and has become the most dominant entity in Lebanon’s political theater.
But, disregarding the use of force to achieve its goals, Hezbollah nor the Iranians are interested in actually governing Lebanon or taking responsibility for the country’s current crisis.
Now, unlike many political commentators, I do not think that Hezbollah is to blame for Lebanon’s problems, in a sense anyway.
Lebanese Shiites, who have long been marginalized by this country’s political system, have a right to assert themselves politically and have their interests represented in the Lebanese government.
Before Hezbollah, and even before the Amal Movement, many Shiites, as well as Greek Orthodox Christians funny enough, dominated the more fringe elements of the leftist scene, such as the Lebanese Communist Party, which enjoyed a large degree of support from Shiites.
However, given Lebanon’s current situation, Hezbollah either needs to step aside or step up to the plate, neither of which it is interested in doing.
Take for instance the recent maritime negotiations with Israel. Hezbollah claimed that it would go to war with Israel only if the Lebanese government asked it to protect Lebanon’s interests.
Of course, Hezbollah is obviously better suited to fight such a war than the Lebanese army, which, in comparison, is under-equipped and under-manned when it comes to fighting an interstate conflict.
However, the President, Michel Aoun, was a Hezbollah ally, the Prime Minister, Najib Miqati, is, at best, neutral, and the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, is also a Hezbollah ally.
Why pretend that the Lebanese government was the one making the decision, when, ultimately, it was Hezbollah that made the final decision on whether to go to war with Israel or not?
Indeed, Hezbollah, and the Iranians in general, are not interested in the accountability and responsibility that correspond with governance, but, at the same time, want to be able to pull the strings of power as they see fit.
The expression, having one’s cake and eating it too, comes to mind.
Lebanon, a broken country with a broken political system, was ripe for the type of intervention that Iran understood best.
The future of the archipelago
The recent “detente” between Saudi Arabia and Iran seems to be defining something that has been understood for some time as a formal geopolitical reality.
The past decade has seen Iran really dig its teeth into Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and the recent news that the Saudis and the Iranians may finally be calling it quits regarding the many proxy wars that engulfed the region since the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011 seems to be more likely than ever.
Early reports suggest that Iran may stop backing the Houthis in Yemen, making it easier for Saudi to reach a political agreement that it finds favorable.
Unlike Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon, the Saudis truly consider Yemen to be their “backyard,” thus why they directly intervened in the country militarily in 2015.
With Yemen off the geopolitical chessboard, it would not be hard for Saudi Arabia to concede something that has been the reality since 2018, that being that Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon are firmly within the Iranian sphere of influence, and there is little it can do to prevent that.
This is why one should only consider these three countries to be the archipelago that I am defining, as, much like an actual archipelago ( a coherent group of islands), Iran’s influence in these countries is not necessarily contiguous.
Iran does not have fully subservient administrations in Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon. However, it does have sub-state actors that are capable of either dominating the state or, at the very least, controlling the most essential assets in Iran’s regional strategy, such as border crossings and critical infrastructure in the case of Syria.
However, there are limits to this approach.
As I touched on in the section dealing with Iraq, the Iranians are incredibly arrogant when it comes to their sphere of influence. Honestly, I think they would have a far easier time if they just got rid of the bloody banners, flags, posters, and billboards. Baghdad is the second largest city in the Arab world, and the Iranians think they can cover it in their colors without consequence.
This will only breed contempt in the hearts of those they seek to use as conduits of their influence, not to mention other populations present within the archipelago.
On a purely economic note, it frankly scares foreigners, who are a useful asset in extracting foreign currency.
I have grown accustomed to the myriad of posters one may find in Beirut or Baghdad, but the average tourist has not, and this will keep them away.
Another issue is the fact that all the countries in the Iranian sphere of influence are not in the slightest functional states, which will, again, breed contempt within the hearts of the local population.
Sure, the Iranians are comfortable using force, but such means can only go so far. As the revolutions in Iraq and Lebanon demonstrated, there is a growing sentiment, within even the Shiite community, that Iran is just another foreign power trying to exploit the Arab people.
On the geopolitical front, there are also disadvantages. Israel, which can essentially do whatever it wants due to US cover, has only escalated its aggressive posture toward Iranian military infrastructure, primarily in Syria, since Iran’s recent understanding with Saudi Arabia.
Granted, Israeli strikes are likely just a drop in the bucket, but, ultimately, Iran does not need the Israelis pushing an even harder line in its sphere of influence.
The Israelis, who are becoming even more oppressive toward the Palestinians and hawkish on the regional scene, it seems, are intensely anxious regarding this possible detente.
They will keep pushing back against the Iranians, regardless of their allies’ posture.
Look, I know this was a long post, but I thought it would be worth noting my thoughts and trying to encapsulate both the current situation in the region and where it might be headed.
The Middle East’s tectonic plates continue to shift at a rapid pace, and I really couldn’t tell you what I think will happen in the future.
All I know is that, at least for now, Iran’s archipelago is here to stay, and those living within it will likely have to figure out how to navigate a realism-based regional order that simply does not care.
But alas, dear readers, I will again bid you adieu, at least until next time.
Cheers!
Hi Dave! Phenomenal piece and really appreciate your observations/perspectives.
With new developments in the past 6 months and the ongoing conflicts in Gaza/Israel - I wonder if you have any new thoughts on this "detente"? Are you seeing any significant shifts in the regional dynamics? English language media has not covered this topic extensively and your insights here are truly invaluable. Thank you so much!