Things in Northern Syria have heated up in the last few days as Russia conducts airstrikes in Turkish-occupied areas. Russian airstrikes pounded the town of Barad in the Afrin pocket, which is administered by Turkey. Alongside this, there were the first ever Russian airstrikes against Turkish-backed forces in the Peace Spring area, which is in Northeast Syria.
There is a meeting between Russia’s Putin and Turkey’s Erdogan on September 29, and this escalation will have a dramatic impact on how that meeting goes. The Russians are “turning up the heat.”
Russia and the regime have been pounding Idlib, which is controlled by HTS, for months, but Turkey had done very little to counteract this. Perhaps feeling emboldened after cementing a new status quo in Dara’a, Russia wants to hammer out a new status quo in Northern Syria.
There has been a lot of noise on twitter about this, and I am honestly somewhat torn. A lot of people are expecting to see an agreement in which Turkey gives up part of Idlib (likely the M4 highway as well as rebel-held territory South of it) in exchange for some areas in Kurdish-controlled Northeast Syria. I am not completely sold on this, because even with a deal in place, it is not like HTS or the Kurds themselves are agreeing to it. Thus, such a deal would still require military offensives to capture the territory, and I have not yet seen the on-the-ground indications of such offensives.
Usually, Russia and the regime will saturate an entire area with intense aerial bombardment, and then eventually slowly advance into that area, clearing any resistance in a conventional manner. I have not seen this level of saturation as of yet, but it could increase. Russian strikes in Idlib have been slowly increasing for months, much like they did in 2019 before major offensives, but they have not reached the intensity one would expect for an offensive, though I would say they are getting close. Turkey seems content allowing the ceasefire in Idlib to breakdown as long as there is no territorial change.
Turkey’s main motive for protecting Idlib is not the kindness of Erdogan’s heart, but the 3-4 million potential refugees residing in Idlib. Erdogan has been hammered for his handling of the Syrian civil war, especially regarding refugees, as there is a strong anti-refugee sentiment in many parts of Turkey. Millions of new possible refugees could attempt to enter Turkey if the regime and Russia launch another offensive, and this would be detrimental to Erdogan’s political standing. Even a relatively minor offensive could have serious consequences.
Targeting Turkish-occupied areas is a serious move, and Erdogan will likely not be happy with this. Like I wrote earlier, this is the first time Russia has conducted airstrikes in Turkey’s Northeast zone of control, which is often called the Peace Spring area, as that was the name of the Turkish operation. It should be noted that the area that Russia struck was one in which there had been an escalation from the Turkish side. This area was attacked by Turkish-backed forces on a number of occasions recently, and that is likely why Russia intervened in that area in support of Kurdish forces.
I wonder how much of this escalation was to a signal to Kurdish forces that Russia was willing to attack their enemies when it was in its interest. However, it is clear to most that the marriage between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the regime is one of convenience and not love. The government and its supporters often remind us that they will capture “every inch” of Syria, including the SDF-controlled areas, but they have a common enemy, so for now, they cooperate.
Pro-regime twitter has been predicting or calling for an offensive on Idlib for the past six months or so, but I have continued to doubt them. However, recently, Russia has been making statements that seem to suggest it is warming to a new offensive. If airstrikes pick up after the meeting on September 29th, it could be an indication of an upcoming offensive. I will surely have something to say about it.