The Return to Aleppo
After almost 8 years, Syrian rebels have returned to Aleppo city
Hello again dear readers,
As I am writing this post, Syrian rebel factions led by Hya’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) are advancing in Aleppo after reaching the city’s gates this morning. This is the most dramatic shakeup in Syria in years, and the rebel offensive is exceeding all expectations in terms of success. I don’t think any analyst, even yesterday, believed that rebel forces would be able to sweep into the city, but we have all been proven wrong.
As of now, the situation roughly looks like this:
This morning, rebel forces reportedly captured the Military Research Center on Aleppo’s western outskirts. From there, they quickly swept into the New Aleppo neighborhood, advancing toward the city center. In the following hours, rebel forces spread out into Hamdaniyeh, Saleheddine, Furqan, and Aleppo University. There are some reports coming out that rebels have already reached Saadallah Jabiri Square, the heart of the city, but this is still unconfirmed. There have also been reports that rebel forces seized Anadan and Hreitan, cutting the road between the city and strategic regions in the northern countryside, but this has not yet been substantiated.
What is so shocking about the rebels’ blitzkrieg is the fact that they have captured neighborhoods they were unable to enter for over four years. Here are some maps of Aleppo city during the peak of rebel gains in the city in mid-2012.
As you can see, the rebels never managed to reach the city center or capture areas like New Aleppo or Furqan, but they have taken them now after only three days. The situation is obviously very fluid, but the government’s reported counteroffensive last night clearly failed. Government forces were reportedly to advanced from Hamdaniyeh into Khan al-Asal followed by Kafr Naha, Mansoura, Kafr Dael, and Babis. Given the fact that rebels managed to penetrate just north of these positions, fighting may have prevent them from entering from the city’s main entrance along the M5 Highway, which leads to Damascus.
This was the general situation yesterday, before the rebels entered the city proper.
In addition to entering the city, rebel forces continued their advance in eastern Idlib and the southern Aleppo countryside, capturing Sarqib, al-Eis, and al-Hadhir, critical logistical points for government forces. The M5 highway is effectively under rebel control all the way from Saraqib to Aleppo city. There are reports that government forces are in disarray, with many saying the city’s fall will happen soon, which will completely change the balance of power in Syria.
Another interesting factor influencing the rebels’ advance, is the lack of a serious Russian response. From reports on social media, Russian forces in the region are withdrawing toward Damascus and have said that the regime must deal with this crisis on its own, though Russian airstrikes on rebel-held downs in Idlib have continued. Analysts like Karam Sha’ar are saying that both Turkey and Russia seek to pressure the regime into negotiations, but it is still very difficult to determine what’s happening here.
Though, as I mentioned in my initial post covering the rebel offensive, Turkey must have given HTS the green light to launch this attack, it is still unclear how decisive Turkish support currently is or if anyone expected the attack to be this successful. I had originally thought this attack was largely symbolic to help shore up HTS’s popularity, but now I think something far larger is going on, especially considering Russia’s response to the offensive. The regime has began calling up reinforcements from Damascus, the Badia desert, and Deir ez-Zor near the Iraqi border. The National Defense Forces (NDF), local militias first organized with Iranian assistance early in the conflict, are also expected to deploy to the area. It is unclear if they will reach the city in time. Government forces are still in Aleppo, but their disposition is unclear.
It seems government troops were caught completely off guard, and their defense lines have collapsed. It is quite telling how ineffective government forces are when they are not reinforced by Iranian-backed militias or Russian air support. To my knowledge, Iranian-backed forces are the strongest in Aleppo’s eastern neighborhoods, the southern countryside, and the Shiite villages of Nubl and Zahraa in the northern countryside. It is currently unclear if Iran has the capacity to send significant reinforcements to northern Syria. As of now, the rebels are still advancing.
Overall, I need to think more before I can come up with more analysis. I originally thought the government would be able to take control of the situation within a few weeks to a month, but now, the situation is far worse. If rebels can capture more of Aleppo city and have enough time to dig in, it could become either incredibly costly or nearly impossible to dislodge them. The regime lost thousands of fighters in the offensives against rebel forces in northern Syria in 2019 and 2020. An assault to retake Aleppo could prove catastrophic.
As I said earlier, if the rebels manage to capture Aleppo, the strategic balance in Syria will have been completely changed. It would also demonstrate a few things: Turkey has lost its patience with both the regime in Damascus and the refugee situation within Turkey and along the Syrian border; Iran’s intervention in the October 7 war has weakened it across the fronts; the rebels, namely HTS, have used the last few years of quiet to build their forces and prepare; the war in Ukraine has weakened Russia’s position in Syria significantly.
I was honestly in shock when I awoke this morning to picture and videos of rebel fighters in New Aleppo and Furqan. Pro-regime accounts are saying they will retake the areas lost as more loyalist forces reach the city, but the rebels’ momentum has not been stopped. It is unclear to me if Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the leader of HTS, expected this offensive to be so successful. As I indicated in my initial post responding to the offensive, I listed three possible military goals: the isolation of the Tel Rifa’at pocket in the northern Aleppo countryside, securing rebel positions overlooking Aleppo city, and cutting the M5 Highway to Damascus. The rebels have effectively achieved all three of these goals in the last day or so, but I did not expect capturing Aleppo city to be an objective or even possible.
Granted, the heavy defense lines present along Aleppo’s outskirts have been reduced in recent years, as normalcy slowly returned to the city. In the last year or so, the government even began dismantling some of the checkpoints to enter the city. This was clear a mistake, as rebel forces quickly swept through gaps in the government’s defenses.
Either way, dear readers, I will post more in the coming days and keep you updated. If rebel reports prove to be true, the situation in the city may possibly look like this by now:
The rebels have reportedly asked civilians to stay in their homes as they move through the city, insisting that they will be save and that religious minorities (like Christians, Armenians, and Kurds) will not be targeted. This map shows the areas of Aleppo in which minorities (including groups like Turkmen) are most present:
The areas in yellow are those inhabited by Kurds. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which controls northeast Syria and is dominated by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), are also present in these areas. SDF reinforcements are reportedly headed to the city’s Kurdish neighborhoods to reinforce them.
Both Kurds and Christians are generally apprehensive of the rebels, as they are supported by Turkey, but this is a broad generalization. Rebels first entered the Christian districts of Aleppo in August and September of 2012, but they were quickly expelled by government forces alongside the residents of these neighborhoods, who were scared that they would be made second-class citizens or killed under the rebels’ rule. Reports have indicated that many in the city have fled to the Kurdish districts of Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud, as the presence of the SDF in these neighborhoods may mean that the rebels will avoid entering those neighborhoods. I would not be shocked if many Christians are also moving toward these neighborhoods, but I am yet to see any reports regarding this.
Overall, the situation is very fluid, and now it seems that anything could happen. A pro-government account I follow that is reasonably reliable recently said that communications between government forces have broken down, with Republican Guard troops falling back to the city center. I have seen some other reports that Iranian-backed militias (including Iraqi and Afghan formations) are mobilizing, but their impact has yet to be seen.
The situation is very fluid, and I will continue to follow it closely.
Til next time.